

6a



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

4. 8. 1962  
2. C. 1. 1962 sent

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

December 11, 1962

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

Weekly Report

1. Your suggestion to Japanese cabinet ministers that the United States and Japan co-operate to prevent domination of Asia by a Communist movement aroused a strong and chilly reaction in Japan. The statement was given banner headline treatment and heavy radio and TV play.

Asahi said that "even clever Kennedy does not understand Oriental feeling. Japan's position will be decided by the Japanese." Yomiuri observed that "the Japanese cabinet ministers did not go to Washington to hear a lecture by President Kennedy."

Mainichi probably cut to the heart of the Japanese position when it said that the Japanese should not co-operate in the American policy unconditionally because the Japanese want better relations with mainland China and new export markets.

The old lure of mainland China as a market was documented in a mid-1962 public opinion survey, in which 73 per cent of the people favored trading with Communist China and more than 50 per cent said the results of such trade would be beneficial.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d) AND 11

ICA (UK 78-414)  
BY BJA NARS DATE 1/16/79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Ambassador Stevenson is a fanatical advocate of the imperialist policies of the U. S. monopolies, but, as an "experienced and sober politician," realized during the Cuban crisis that the U. S. "lacks both the power and opportunity to force its will on others," according to Radio Moscow.

The Moscow commentator, speaking on the domestic service on December 7, added that American "vultures" who think saber rattling is the summit of political wisdom have made Stevenson a scapegoat to ease their anger over the "lost chance" in Cuba.

Izvestia front paged your letter to Stevenson, but Soviet media otherwise have given the story comparatively little attention.

3. A post mortem assessment of reactions to the Cuban crisis in the Free World isolates three principal psychological problems, of which one was fully solved, one partially so, and one remains.

a. Original refusal to believe your statement that the Soviets had placed offensive weapons in Cuba. Widespread distribution of the pictures went far to nail this one, and the Khrushchev admission finished it.

b. A base in Cuba and a base in Turkey are the same thing. This would have given us real problems if the Soviets had been in a position to push it. They are now beginning to revive it in their propaganda output.

c. David and Goliath. Castro and his slingshot were confronted by the overwhelming power of the U. S. This line emerged particularly in Africa and the Near East, where unsophisticated observers did not understand the true nature of the threat, and will undoubtedly persist.

Nevertheless, most commentators even in Africa understood that this was a confrontation between the U. S. and the USSR, and the overwhelming majority interpreted the results as a victory for your Administration.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

4. After the first day's wave of complaint, the British press began taking a more moderate position on the December 5 remarks of Dean Acheson. By December 7, the Times reported a "calmer view" prevailing in British official circles, and the Guardian said Acheson held opinions "which Englishmen only admit in the privacy of their clubs."

"Cassandra" of the Daily Mirror gave the speech ringing endorsement, commenting that Acheson was "not anti-British but certainly pro-American," and that he was right in the "harsh things" he had to say.

Both in England and on the Continent the strongest criticism came from the right wing. A number of papers raised the question of whether Acheson had "a mandate from the White House" for the speech, as Le Monde put it. Paris Presse used it as a departure point for further comment, referring to Secretary McNamara as "the useless envoy whom Kennedy is sending to Paris ... to discourage the Europeans from following de Gaulle. But it is too late. The French striking force will be born no matter what happens."

Italian editorials were similar to the French, with the exception of Avanti! (Socialist), which saw the speech as heralding the beginning of a new "McCarthyist" wave in U. S. foreign policy with echoes of the roll-back doctrine.

5. Indian opinions of the United States have improved spectacularly since the Chinese invasion and the provision of military assistance, according to a late November survey in New Delhi by the Gallup affiliate.

The first week in October, only 7 per cent of a New Delhi sample registered a "very good" opinion of the U. S., and 27 per cent a "good" opinion. The last week in November 62 per cent said "very good" and another 27 per cent "good." Ninety per cent were aware of U. S. assistance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6a  
CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

The USSR suffered a perceptible, if smaller, drop in public esteem. "Very good" opinions went from 22 per cent to 6 per cent, "good" opinions stayed roughly constant at about 25 per cent, and "bad" opinions of the USSR increased from 5 to 24 per cent.

6. We are furnishing the Indian Government with lists of African leaders who will be sent information on the Red Chinese invasion and, in some cases, be invited to India for a first hand look.

Edward R. Murrow  
Director

CONFIDENTIAL